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1  Introduction
1 2 3 4 5 6
Terrorism risks are complex phenomena and have great 
potential to evoke deep public concern (Jarrett, 2005). In the 
literature there are a variety of definitions of terrorism stem-
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ming from the different p erspectives of p oliticians, academ-
ics, security experts, etc. Schwenkenbecher (2012: 14) defined 
terrorism as a strategy or a tactic that employs violence or 
force in order to reach political objectives. Public perceptions 
of the risk of terrorism are very important for directing risk 
management decision-making and for preparedness plan-
ning. Regarding public risk perception of terrorism threats, 
the following specific characteristics were examined in order 
to identify methods to more effectively implement new ini-
tiatives aimed at strengthening the management of terrorism 
risks (Cvetković, 2017). Also, this information can be used to 
inform risk communication strategies. Generally, prepared-
ness may be defined as the knowledge, capabilities and actions 
of governments, organizations, community groups, and indi-
viduals ‘‘to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, 
the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or 
conditions’’ (UNISDR, 2009). The preparedness level of indi-
viduals is determined by assessing the degree to which such 
persons use material and intellectual resources such as emer-
gency funds and personal disaster kits; timely access to disas-
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ter alerts and knowledge of evacuation routes, and the strength 
of their social support networks (e.g., families, churches, lo-
cal response organizations) (Cvetković, Ristanović & Gačić, 
2018; Reininger et al, 2013). On the other hand, household 
preparedness is determined by assessing level of risk knowl-
edge and actions taken such as: 1) developing an emergency 
plan; 2) possessing a family emergency kit in the home; and 
3) having enough reserve of food, water, and medical supplies
to last at least 72 hours (Cvetković et al., 2018; Levac, Toal, & 
O’Sullivan, 2012). Adequate individual and household prepar-
edness have been shown to strengthen individual resilience to 
trauma as well as possibly deterring a potential terrorist attack 
if the terrorists believe that the attack may be less successful 
due to high levels of preparedness among individuals, house-
holds and communities (Eisenman et al, 2006).
Prior studies on public risk perception have found that 
several factors (e.g., gender, age, income level, education) tend 
to influence citizen’s perceptions of terrorism risk. Lerner, 
Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff (2003) have reported that al-
most half of their survey respondents perceived the average 
American as being likely to be hurt in a terrorist attack within 
the coming year. Eisenman et al. (2006) found a significantly 
lower frequency of individual-level preparedness for terrorism 
in Los Angeles County compared with populations considered 
more vulnerable to a terrorist event. Drakos and Muller (2014) 
investigated whether differences in terrorism risk are mirrored 
on terrorism risk perception in several European countries for 
the period 2003-2007. Their results showed that observed ter-
rorism risk perception variation among these countries was 
related to relative numbers of terrorist attacks experienced by 
a given country. In other words, average propensity for ter-
rorism risk concern is affected by actual risk levels. According 
to Shay (2017), the Balkans are believed by Islamic terrorist 
organizations to be the gateway to the heart of Europe. The 
strategic importance of this fact cannot be overemphasized. 
Islamic terrorist groups hope to use countries in the Balkans 
such as Serbia to promote their activities in Western Europe, 
Russia, and other focal points worldwide. Furthermore, mili-
tant “home-grown” Islamic fundamentalism is rapidly spread-
ing in countries such as Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM), Bulgaria, Turkey, and Albania 
(Ranstorp & Xhudo, 1994). Regarding the Republic of Serbia, 
it has a long history of terrorist threats. Starting from the end 
of the Second World War onwards, there have been two ma-
jor lines of terrorism threats: ideologically motivated terror-
ism during former Yugoslavia, and separatist terrorism re-
lated to Albanians’ aspirations for the separation of Kosovo 
and Metohija that escalated during the 90s (Erjavec & Volcic, 
2006). Nowadays, the Republic of Serbia is, besides the con-
tinuous threat of Albanian terrorism, faced with international 
terrorism occasioned by religious extremism. 
The only official document containing a terrorism threat 
assessment for the Republic of Serbia is the “National Strategy 
for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism for the Period 
2017−2021.” It holds that the threat of terrorism is real and 
events are possible. An ongoing delicate security situation in 
Kosovo and Metohija and an unfolding drama in the Middle 
East and Africa all have an impact on the Western Balkans 
region. Serbia, as well as its immediate neighbourhood, is 
faced with increased radicalization and extremism that can 
lead to active terrorism if precursors to the use of violence are 
not properly addressed. Networking among the proponents 
of radical Islamist movements is taking place. They intend to 
spread radical ideas, and take advantage of conditions of the 
massive influx of migrants and the return of terrorist fight-
ers from conflict areas to Serbia and/or to the region. The 
Republic of Serbia is even more vulnerable and exposed to 
threat of a terrorism than any of its neighbours. The exact 
number of Islamic State supporters and members from Serbia 
is very difficult to determine, as are their intentions and their 
interest in conducting an attack in Serbia. There are no an-
nual surveys assessing Serbian citizens who have left Syria 
and Iraq, but according to the Serbian Military Agency most 
Serbs remained in Europe in 2013 and 2014. Only 26 indi-
viduals are still believed to be fighting with ISIS or Al Nusra 
in Syria and Iraq. National Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Serbia mentions only that the Republic of Serbia, in terms of 
global terrorism, “may be the target of terrorist activity, both 
directly and using its territory for the preparation and execu-
tion of terrorist actions in other countries” (Government of 
the Republic of Serbia, 2017a, 2017b). It also points out that 
the Republic of Serbia is facing transnational and cross-bor-
der crime, making the link between terrorism and all forms of 
organized crime particularly important.
The Chief of the Department for Combating Terrorism 
of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, however, 
posts that the likelihood of a terrorist attack is low at the mo-
ment of the writing of this article. Nevertheless, he points to 
the phenomenon of increasing radicalization in Serbia, espe-
cially to the phenomenon of “self-radicalization” of a signifi-
cant number of young people that find themselves not accept-
ed by their family, by the broader society, or by the specific 
area in which they live. To avoid experiencing transition from 
radicalization to terrorism he suggests taking some preven-
tive measures, including high criminal penalties, monitoring 
of those engaged in propaganda and recruitment, as well as 
using administrative measures to prohibit foreign citizens and 
religious authorities from spreading the ideology of radical 
Islam (Radio Television of Serbia, 2016). These risk forecasts 
are similar to those issued by Aon Risk Solutions, a leading 
global risk management group working in partnership with 
the Risk Advisory Group. They created the Global Terrorism 
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Map to provide insight for businesses aiming to reduce their 
exposure to risk. The risk of terrorism and political violence in 
Serbia, according to this map, is rated as medium, and “a low 
to medium” for the Balkans generally (Balkan Insight, 2015). 
Finally, the United States Department of State’s Crime and 
Safety Report 2016 for Serbia reconfirms the medium rated 
terrorism threat, placing emphasis on Serbia’s geographi-
cal position as a main transit route to Western Europe from 
Africa and the Middle East. This report also expressed con-
cern of the consequences of involvement of fighters from a 
variety of Muslim communities in the Balkans in the Syrian 
conflict, noting that their radicalization might lead in turn to 
the creation of local terrorism aspirations once back home 
(United States Department of State, 2016).
Starting from the above-mentioned condition regarding 
terrorism in Serbia, this paper presents evidence of citizens’ 
perceived risk of terrorist attacks and level of preparedness. 
With regard to public risk perception of terrorism threats, 
the following specific dimensions were examined as required 
steps in identifying methods to effectively perform initiatives 
aimed at the management of terrorism risks: these involve 
gauging perceptions of the likelihood of terrorist attacks, as-
sessing the adequacy of preparedness and security counter-
measures, identifying potential consequences, determining 
most likely methods of attack,  and designating the most likely 
places of these potential terrorist attacks.
2 Terrorism Risk Perception and Preparedness: 
Literature Review
Numerous studies have found that gender is an impor-
tant factor affecting public perception of terrorism threats 
(Dosman, Adamowicz, & Hrudey, 2001; Finucane, Slovic, 
Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000; Lerner et al., 2003; Slovic, 
Malmfors, Krewski, Mertz, Neil, & Bartlett, 1995). Previous 
research has found that men generally perceive a lower level 
of risk than women (Floyd & Pennington-Gray, 2004; Lai & 
Tao, 2003; Slovic, 1999). Slovic (1999) has reported that men 
generally report lower risk estimates, in a range of settings, 
than women. Lerner et al. (2003) show that women report-
ed greater levels of fear whereas men reported greater levels 
of anger in relation to acts of terrorism. Lai and Tao (2003) 
have reported that older people tend to give higher risk es-
timates than younger people. On the other hand, Floyd and 
Pennington-Gray (2004) found no relationship between age 
and risk perception in their research. In addition, a good 
number of scholars (Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, & 
Slovic, 2003; Nacos, 2003; Picard, 1993) have highlighted the 
fact that perceptions of terrorism are influenced by social me-
dia such as news and information from others in one’s social 
circles, information which contributes to everyone feeling 
vulnerable like some kind of target. In terms of marital sta-
tus, this variable does not appear significantly correlated to 
terrorism perception (Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Kamarulnizam, 
Sukma, Jamhari, & Musa, 2012). 
Besides demographic factors, other social-psychological 
factors may bear a relationship with terrorism risk perceptions 
(Floyd, Gibson, Pnnington-Gray, & Thapa, 2004; Goodwin, 
Willson, & Stanley, 2005; Lerner et al., 2003; Sjöberg, 1998). 
It was found in some studies that citizens with lower educa-
tion levels and lower incomes rate risks much higher com-
pared to others (Adeola, 2004; Kanan & Pruitt, 2002). One 
of the studies concerning the perceived threat of terrorist at-
tacks threat in Australia indicated that those with no formal 
educational qualifications were significantly more likely to 
think that a terrorist attack is either very or extremely likely 
to occur in Australia. This same study also reported evidence 
of a correlation between terrorism threat perception and the 
place of residence, with those living in urban health districts 
being significantly more likely to be either very or extremely 
concerned that they or their family would be directly affect-
ed in the event of a terrorist attack than those living in rural 
health districts. Those from rural health districts were much 
less fearful of terrorist attacks (Stevens, Agho, Taylor, Barr, 
Raphael, & Jorm, 2009).
Additionally, a citizen’s geographical location also has in-
fluence on the perceptions of terrorism risk (Friedman, 2005; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986). Different levels of concerns 
were found with respect to the likelihood that they themselves 
would be harmed by the event (Heath, Liao, & Douglas, 2009). 
That kind of concern is very important because citizens, by 
also following the advice of government experts, could change 
their behavior in public places by avoiding mass events and 
use of public transport at critical times (Lee, Chen, Pietz, & 
Benecke, 2009). Better handling of uncertain situations such 
as terrorism attacks is possible in settings where people have a 
high level of trust in their government (Crijns, Cauberghe, & 
Hudders, 2017; Gray & Ropeik, 2002; Rogers, Amlôt, Rubin, 
Wessely, & Krieger, 2007). It is very important to note that 
when both the threat and the efficacy of citizens preparedness 
are perceived as high, there is likely ample motivation on the 
part of citizens to protect themselves from terrorist attacks. 
This is a key phenomenon in preparedness planning, which is 
well explained in Witte’s (1992) Extended Parallel Processing 
Model (EPPM).
A few studies (Canneti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & 
Hobfoll, 2009; Davis & Silver, 2004; Eisenman et al., 2009) 
have dealt with ethnicity and intercultural differences in 
terrorist threat perception. A Los Angeles County popu-
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lation survey indicated that African Americans, Latinos, 
Chinese Americans, Korean Americans, and non-US citi-
zens were more likely to perceive population-level risk as be-
ing high than non-migrant citizens (Eisenman et al., 2009). 
Lemyre, Turner, Lee and Krewski (2006) found that terrorism 
was a low to moderate threat for the Canadian population, 
and an even lower threat to themselves as individuals. Woods, 
Eyck, Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh (2008) found a positive re-
lationship between people’s proximity to a “primary” terrorist 
target and their judgments of the likelihood of a terrorist at-
tack in their home communities in the next 12 months. They 
also found this relationship being especially strong among 
female respondents, and among people with household in-
comes in the lower range. Also, research has been conducted 
on how three different cultures (Christian American, Chinese, 
and Islamic) perceive the route of terrorism, showing no sig-
nificant difference between Islamic and Chinese respondents, 
who both differed from their Christian American counter-
parts (Yueh-Ting, Takaku, Ottati, & Yan, 2004). Finally, in-
teresting research was conducted regarding the effects of fear 
and anger on perceived risks of terrorism (Lerner et al., 2003). 
The results of this study showed that experiencing anger to-
wards terrorism triggered more optimistic beliefs, rather than 
to experiencing fear, which triggered greater pessimism. In 
addition, it was shown that these emotions also influence 
public policy preferences. Primed anger activated more puni-
tive preferences, and fear enhanced preferences for concilia-
tory policies and preventive measures.
Public perception of terrorism threats clearly is affected by 
different demographic (e.g., gender, age, marital status) and 
social-psychological factors (e.g., education level, geographi-
cal location, culture, and degree of fear). Understanding how 
these factors affect behaviour is critical for strengthening 
counter-terrorism preparedness measures through the pro-
motion of desired behavioral change. As our research has 
shown, prior research on community-level understanding 
and citizen perceptions of terrorism threats highlight the 
importance of understanding how demographic and social-
psychological factors on public terrorism risk perception are 
affecting preparedness planning in the Republic of Serbia.
3  History of Terrorist Attacks in Serbia
The emergence of terrorism in Serbia was at its very be-
ginning deeply rooted in ideology. During the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia terrorist activity was related to revolutionary 
anti-royalist organisations such as the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and the Ustaše 
(Croatian fascist organisation). A major terrorist attack dur-
ing this part of Serbia’s history occurred on the occasion of 
King Alexander I of Yugoslavia’s visit to France in Marseilles 
on October 9, 1934. The King was assassinated by IMRO’s 
terrorist Vlado Georgiev Chernozemski while riding in a car 
with the French foreign affairs minister, who also died in the 
attack. The motive behind the terrorist attack was political 
in its nature; IMRO’s main goal was the secession of Vardar 
Macedonia from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Roudometof, 
2002: 93). The same tendencies were developed in Croatia 
among Croatian Ustaše, who supported IMRO during the 
whole operation. 
Terrorism maintained its ideological cast in Yugoslavia 
even after World War II. had ended. The Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia was succeeded by the Federal Socialist Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and terrorism became the weapon of those ani-
mated by anti-communist ideological sentiments, involving 
Četnici and Ustaše for the most part. The common denomi-
nator of all terrorist attacks in this period was that the ma-
jority of terrorist attacks were conducted outside the territory 
of Yugoslavia and were directed against diplomatic missions, 
embassies and diplomats of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav intelligence 
and security services disabled most of the terrorist efforts to 
conduct a terrorist attack on Yugoslavian soil (Independent 
Newspaper, 2016). The majority of illegally infiltrated ter-
rorists were arrested and executed, but some of the terror-
ist attacks outside the borders of Yugoslavia resulted in the 
assassination of Yugoslav diplomats. Some examples are the 
murders of Yugoslav consul Vicko Glumcic in Naples in 1946, 
Yugoslav consul Edvin Zdovec in Frankfurt in 1976, ambassa-
dor Vladimir Rolović in Stockholm on April 7, 1971, as well as 
the failed assassination attempts on the Yugoslav ambassador 
in Germany in 1966 and of the Yugoslav vice-consul in Lyon 
in 1969 (Gibas-Krzak, 2013). Undoubtedly, the most spec-
tacular terrorist attack occurred on September 10, 1976 when 
the Chicago-New York flight was hijacked by five “Fighters for 
Free Croatia”. The perpetrators were all arrested, but one po-
lice officer died while dismantling an explosive device (Pratt, 
2011). However, one of the biggest successfully conducted ter-
rorist attacks of that period in Yugoslavia was the bombing of 
the cinema “20.oktobar” in Belgrade in 1968. This attack, con-
ducted by the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood’s (Ustaše) 
member Miljenko Hrkač, resulted in one person being killed 
and 85 people being injured (Schindler, 2005). 
Rail and train station bombings were also a frequent 
model for terrorist attacks inside Yugoslavia, which happened 
in 1968 leaving 13 people injured and in 1973 in a cloakroom 
of a train station in Belgrade, leaving one dead and eight peo-
ple injured. Mine explosions, smoke bombings, demolitions 
and arson directed against Yugoslav premises and properties 
abroad were also frequent methods of terrorist activity from 
1946 all the way up to the beginning of 1990s (Bieber, 2003). 
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Since the disintegration of Yugoslavia, starting in the 
1990s, Serbia has been facing various kinds of terrorism, but 
primarily those related to Albanians’ aspirations for the sepa-
ration of Kosovo and Metohija. The main terrorist organisa-
tion, the Kosovo Liberation Army, emerged around 1992. 
Having gained access to weapons from looted armouries when 
Albania’s government collapsed in 1997, the KLA established 
training camps in northern Albania around Krume, Kukes, 
and Bajram Curri (Anderson & Sloan, 2009: 361). Terrorist 
acts were directed primarly against the military and police of-
ficers of the Republic of Serbia, but also against Albanians as 
an act of intimidation to those loyal to the Republic of Serbia. 
The attack on a police patrol on February 28, 1998 in 
the village of Likošane was the first serious hint of a large-
scale rebellion entailing the use of terrorist methods. During 
September of 1998 terrorist attacks continued resulting in a 
number of civilian massacres. One of them which took place 
in Glodjane resulted in 30 corpses of Serbian, Albanian and 
Roma nationality being found. Bullet holes on the nearby wall 
of the canal where victims had been found indicated that they 
had been shot at that place while pieces of barbed wire and 
electric cables found at the same place indicating they had pre-
viously been held and tortured (B92, 2007). The attacks on ci-
vilians continued, including one on Serbian teenagers in a bar 
near Peć, and then in July 1999 when 14 Kosovo Serb farmers 
were killed in the village of Staro Gracko after returning from 
a day of harvesting wheat. This was an act condemned world-
wide (BBC News, 1999). The bodies were disfigured, with the 
youngest of the victims being only four years old.
Shortly after the war in Kosovo and Metohija, the KLA 
was transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps until it 
was finally disbanded in 2009. However, it was replaced by 
a newly formed terrorist organisation called the Albanian 
National Army (ANA). Given the fact that the organizational 
and operational core of ANA consisted of the leaders and 
members of the former Kosovo Liberation Army, it continued 
its main goals and activities (Government of the Republic of 
Serbia, 2017b).
Despite the presence of international forces which were 
deployed as a peacekeeping mission, the use of terrorist meth-
ods by Albanian terrorists continued. On February 16, 2001 
another terrorist attack was carried out by activating a road-
side bomb on the main road in the village of Livadice, near 
Podujevo. The first bus out of six in a convoy being escorted 
by KFOR and transporting displaced Serbs from Kosovo 
and Metohija to Gracanica was blown up, leaving 12 civil-
ians killed and 43 injured (Sputnik News, 2016). One of the 
most atrocious terrorist attacks on civilians took place in the 
town of Goraždevac in 2003. On August 13, two Kosovo Serb 
teenagers were killed and four severely injured when Kosovo 
Albanian extremists opened fire on them while they were by 
the river. Since the citizens of Goraždevac were persistent in 
their decision not to leave their homes even if constantly ter-
rorized by violence, the attack on the children is considered to 
be an instance of retribution and the biggest political message 
to be sent (Evening News, 2015). 
The situation with terrorist attacks worsened dramatically 
in March 2004. An escalation of violence started with the re-
port of Kosovo media about deaths of three Kosovar Albanian 
boys who drowned in a river in the Albanian village of Cabra 
near Zubin Potok after jumping into the river fleeing from 
older Serbian young men. According to police evidence, over 
the course of the next seven days there were 33 individual ri-
ots conducted with about 51,000 people being involved. The 
consequences of Albanian attacks on Serbian villages were 
that 28 people were killed and 870 were injured from both 
communities. The attackers also burned or blew up about 30 
Serbian churches, damaged 11 churches and monasteries, and 
destroyed 286 houses in addition to destroying 72 UN vehi-
cles (B92 Net, 2018). 
Despite numerous peace treaties, there is still an ongo-
ing terrorist threat in Kosovo and Metohija to this very day. 
All public events in Kosovo and Metohija, especially religious 
gatherings, are assessed as carrying the risk of a terrorist at-
tack (N1, 2017). Continuous violence differing widely in 
intensity persists. In July 2009, an attack on a Gendarmerie 
vehicle resulted in the injury of two officers, and in February 
2010, an ethnic-Albanian member of the Serbian police force 
in Bujanovac was targeted by a car bomb, which injured him 
and his family seriously (Fulton, 2010: 134).
According to available data, the Serbian government 
claimed that over the period January 1 1998 to June 10 1999 the 
Kosovo Liberation Army killed 988 people and kidnapped 287, 
and that an additional 847 were killed and another 1,154 were 
kidnapped in the period from June 10, 1999 to November 11, 
2001, after NATO had taken control over Kosovo (Anderson 
& Sloan, 2009: 363). According to the official statistics of the 
Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia for the period 
from 1991 to 2004, 10,954 terrorist attacks were conducted with 
6,590 persons being killed. Nearly, three in four (74%) of the vic-
tims (4,922 persons) were civilians, 18% (1,310 persons) were 
police officers, and only 8% military (358 soldiers) (Stevanović, 
2016: 44). According to data of the Government of the Republic 
of Serbia, there are about 280,000 internally displaced and ex-
pelled persons from Kosovo and Metohija (Government of the 
Republic of Serbia, 1991). The most common forms of activi-
ties of Albanian terrorists were setting up ambush and placing 
mine-explosive devices on roads and bridges. 
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4  Methods
The aim of this paper is to determine the citizens’ perceived 
risk of terrorist attack and level of preparedness, as viewed in 
a gender perspective. Regarding public risk perception of ter-
rorism threats, the following variables were analysed: 1) per-
ception of the likelihood of terrorist attacks; 2) preparedness 
levels of individuals, households, security services and the 
community at-large; 3) potential consequences; 4) terrorist 
attack methods utilized; and 5) most likely terrorist attack lo-
cations (See Table 1). Further explanations are included at the 
bottom of Table 1. At different times of day, between June and 
September 2017, survey data were collected by means of a tel-
ephone survey using a random digit dialing procedure with a 
contact rate being 68%, and the refusal rate being 39%. In our 
research, 485 (29%) respondents participated with informed 
consent gained from all participating subjects. T-test (ana-
lysing gender and employment status) and ANOVA analysis 
(looking at variables such as age, marital status and education 
level) were chosen to examine the relationship between differ-
ent factors and each dependent variable. 
4.1  Survey Instruments
Twenty-one close-ended, multiple choice and 5-point 
Likert scale questions based on widely-accepted data collec-
tion methods (Fischhoff  et al., 2006; Wolff & Larsen, 2014; 
Woods et al., 2008) were asked in order to identify perceived 
risk of terrorist attacks and levels of preparedness. The first 
part of the questionnaire is related to demographic and socio-
economic characteristics (15 items) of the interviewees, and 
the second part is related to perception of the likelihood of the 
terrorist attacks, state of preparedness (household, commu-
nity) and security, potential consequences, expected methods 
and place of the terrorist attacks. The above-mentioned items 
were arrayed on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 
5 = strongly agree). 
Table 1: Set of independent variables about terrorism threats risk perception of citizens in Belgrade 
Variable M S.D.
Perception of the likelihood
One year likelihood of occurrence 2.26 1.05
Five years likelihood of occurrence 2.61 1.05
Ten years likelihood of occurrence 2.89 1.15
Perception of the level of preparedness and security
Individual preparedness 2.74 1.32
Household preparedness 3.13 .99
Community preparedness 2.35 1.01
Personal security 3.23 1.14
Fear 2.55 1.12
Perception of the consequences
Loss of life 2.09 .997
Injuries 2.46 1.03
Material consequences 2.48 1.07
Perception of the execution method
Cold weapons 2.01 1.01
Fire weapons 2.98 1.03
Explosive 3.45 .95
Chemical weapons 2.72 1.22
Biological wapons 2.67 1.23
Nuclear weapons 2.26 1.36
Public place 3.63 1.15
Public building 3.49 1.12
Perception of the potential place of the terrorist attack
Airplane 3.31 1.11
Bus 2.87 1.09
Train 2.78 1.08
Public authorities and personalities 2.72 1.18
Health care institutions 2.66 1.18
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4.2  Sample
The interviewees included 58.4% women and 41.6% men 
(95% fully completed questionnaire), and the average age of 
respondents was 36 years old. The most highly represented 
category included those younger than 34. The majority of 
respondents had secondary educational degree. Regarding 
marital status, single people account for 40.1% of the sample. 
The majority of the respondents are employed (Table 2).
Table 2:  Basic demographic and socio-economic information 
of respondents (n=485)
Variable Category f %
Gender
Male 202 41.6
Female 283 58.4
Age
Younger (18-38) 290 59.7
Middle aged (39-59) 120 24.7
Elderly (over 59) 75 15.4
Education level
Secondary 352 72.5
High school 51 10.5
University 82 16.9
Marital status
Single 195 40.1
In relationship 138 28.4
Married 152 31.3
Employment 
status
Yes 220 45.3
No 265 54.6
5  Results
5.1  Terrorism Risk Perception and Preparedness
In Figure 1 the authors summarize the percentage of re-
spondents and related Likert scale values given for likelihood 
of occurrence of terrorist attacks. Respondents were asked 
to assess the likelihood of a terrorist attack first in the next 
year, and then in five years, and then in ten years. The average 
value of the expected likelihood of terrorist attack in the next 
year is 2.26, five years 2.61 and 10 years 2.89. Further analysis 
indicates that 56.7% of respondents do not expect a terrorist 
attack in the next year, 41.8% in the next five years and 28.9% 
in the next ten years. In accordance with the obtained results, 
it can be said with confidence that most citizens expect a ter-
rorist attack in the next ten years (Figure 1).
Perceptions of one year likelihood of the occurrence of 
terrorist attacks varied significantly by gender t (317.2) = 2.84, 
p = .005; age F (2,481) = 7.41, p = .001 and by marital status F 
(3,481) = 19.26, p = .000), but did not vary by either education 
level F (3,482) = 1.87, p = .142 or employment status t (350) 
= 1.24, p = .172. It was found that men, the elderly, married 
persons, reported higher mean perception of terrorist attacks 
in the next year compared to the women, younger people and 
single persons (Table 3). 
By contrast, regarding five years likelihood, perceptions 
did not significantly vary by gender F (300.9) = -.231, p = .817 
and employment status F (470) = .489, p = .625, but did sig-
nificantly vary by age F (2,482) = 13.30, p = .000, marital status 
F (3,481) = 28.17, p = .000, and education level F (3,482) = 
Figure 1: Percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given for one, 
ten and five years’ likelihood of occurrence of terrorist attacks
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3.84, p = .012. It was found that younger, married, and people 
with secondary school all reported higher mean perception of 
the likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist attacks in the next 
five years compared to the elderly, single persons, and people 
with university degrees (Table 3).
Perceptions of ten years likelihood did not significantly 
vary by gender t (324.6) = -1.02, p = .305; employment status 
t (480) = -.356, p = .707, or education level F (3,482) =2.02, p 
= .055, but significantly varied by age F (2,482) = 6.1, p = .003; 
and marital status F (3, 481) = 12.19, p = .000. It was found 
that the elderly and married reported higher mean perception 
of the likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist attacks in the 
next five years compared to their younger and single counter-
parts (Table 3).
In addition to assessing the level of likelihood of a ter-
rorist attack, respondents were asked to assess the level of 
their own individual preparedness, household preparedness, 
community preparedness to respond, and their personal se-
curity. In Figure 2, the authors summarize the percentage of 
respondents and related Likert scale value given for individu-
als, households and community preparedness with assess-
ment of personal security. It was found that the perception of 
individual preparedness is M = 2.74, household preparedness 
M = 3.13 and community preparedness M = 2.35. In addition, 
55.6% of the respondents believe that the local community 
is unprepared to respond, 45.1% that the citizens are unpre-
pared, and 24.7% that households are unprepared. Regarding 
the results presented, the respondents mostly feel that house-
holds are prepared for responding to emergency situations 
caused by terrorist attacks (Figure 2).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (mean scores) on a perception the likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist attacks
Gender Age Education level Marital status Employment status
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One year 
likelihood 
occurrence
2.44 
(1.29)
2.14 
(.830)
2.17 
(.904)
2.22 
(.998)
2.68 
(1.51)
2.33 
(1.15)
2.01 
(.900)
2.26 
(.894)
1.86 
(.976)
2.28 
(.816)
2.71 
(1.20)
2.35 
(1.30)
2.21 
(.873)
Five years 
likelihood 
occurrence
2.59 
(1.33)
2.62 
(.792)
2.51 
(.929)
2.39 
(.852)
1.44 
(.165)
2.64 
(1.21)
2.74 
(.446)
2.48 
(1.10)
2.30 
(.949)
2.52 
(.905)
3.13 
(1.08)
2.64 
(1.31)
2.59 
(.850)
Ten years 
likelihood 
occurrence
2.83 
(1.40)
2.94 
(.934)
2.87 
(1.14)
2.69 
(.861)
3.29 
(1.44)
2.85 
(1.34)
3.29 
(.565)
2.84 
(.910)
2.78 
(1.22)
2.86 
(1.08)
3.20 
(1.15)
2.87 
(1.31)
2.91 
(1.05)
*  In parentheses shown standard deviation. 
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Individual preparedness perception significantly varied 
by gender t (1, 483) = 97.55, p = .000; age F (2,482) = 22.16, p = 
.001 and marital status F (3,482) = 15.30, p = .000; employment 
status F (1,483) = 36.44, p = .000, but did not significantly vary 
by education level F (3,481) = 0.851, p = .063. It was found 
that men, the middle aged, married persons, and employed 
persons reported higher mean individual preparedness level 
compared to the women, younger persons, respondents in a 
relationship, and unemployed persons (Table 4).
Household preparedness perception varied significantly 
by gender t (1,483) = 39.43, p = .000; age F (2,482) = 28.32, 
p = .001; by education level F (3,482) = 11.41, p = .000; by 
marital status F (3,482) = 29.74, p = .000; and by employment 
status F (1,483) = 22.68, p = .000. It was found that the men, 
younger, respondents with secondary education, married per-
sons, and employed persons reported higher mean household 
preparedness levels compared to women, the middle aged, 
respondents with university education, single persons, and 
unemployed persons (Table 4).
Community preparedness perception significantly varied 
by gender F (1,483) = 4.96, p = .026; age F (2,482) = 13.02, p = 
.000; by education level F (3,481) = 4.58, p = .005; by marital 
status F (3,482) = 6.85, p = .000; and by employment status F 
(1,483) = 19.10, p = .000. It was found that men, the elderly, 
respondents with secondary education, married persons, and 
employed persons reported higher mean community prepar-
edness levels compared to the women, younger persons, re-
spondents with university education, those in a relationship, 
and unemployed persons (Table 4).
Personal security perception varied significantly by gen-
der F (1, 483) = 67.68, p = .000; age F (2,482) = 10.93, p = 
.000; by marital status F (3,482) = 13.93, p = .000; and by em-
ployment status F (1,483) = 5.45, p = .020, but did not vary 
significantly by education level F (3,481) = 1.91, p = .056. It 
was found that men, middle aged persons, single persons, and 
employed persons reported higher mean personal security 
level compared to women, younger people, married persons, 
and unemployed people (Table 4).
Figure 2: Percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given for 
individual, household and community preparedness with assessment of personal security
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5.2  Perceptions of consequences of terrorist attacks
Respondents were asked to assess the level of probability 
for loss of life, injuries and material consequences during ter-
rorist attacks. In Figure 3, authors summarize the percentage 
of respondents and related Likert scale values given for per-
ception of loss of life, injuries and material consequences in 
terrorist attacks. In relation to the mean values of the scores, 
the lowest number of respondents (M = 2.09) believe that they 
could lose their lives, sustain injuries (M = 2.46), and suffer 
material consequences (M = 2.48). In relation to the Likert 
scale, 14% of respondents believe that due to terrorist attacks 
they could experience material consequences, then injures 
13.2% and lose their lives 5.2% (Figure 3).
Table 4: Descriptive statistics (mean scores) given for preparedness and security perception
Gender Age Education level Marital status Employment status
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Individual 
preparedness
3.38 
(1.16)
2.28 
(1.23)
2.50 
(1.33)
3.43 
(.959)
2.68 
(1.38)
2.65 
(1.41)
3.34 
(1.11)
2.69 
(1.14)
2.76 
(1.55)
2.35 
(1.11)
2.99 
(1.07)
3.18 
(1.28)
2.46 
(1.26)
Household 
preparedness
3.47 
(.95)
2.89 
(.94)
2.91 
(.983)
2.62 
(1.01)
2.68 
(1.06)
3.26 
(.969)
3.39 
(.495)
2.91 
(1.06)
3.21 
(.940)
2.60 
(.863)
3.53 
(.956)
3.39 
(.923)
2.97 
(.999)
Community 
preparedness
2.47 
(.94)
2.26 
(1.03)
2.16 
(.944)
2.62 
(1.01)
2.68 
(1.06)
2.38 
(1.01)
2.65 
(.582)
2.17 
(1.08)
2.35 
(1.11)
2.10 
(.930)
2.56 
(.919)
2.60 
(1.06)
2.19 
(.932)
Personal 
security
3.70 
(1.03)
2.90 
(1.09)
3.07 
(1.14)
3.67 
(.797)
3.26 
(1.38)
3.15 
(1.40)
3.68 
(1.01)
3.29 
(1.24)
3.64 
(1.18)
2.78 
(.94)
3.43 
(1.17)
3.38 
(1.01)
3.14 
(1.21)
*  In parentheses shown standard deviation. 
Figure 3: Percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given for 
perception of loss of life, injuries and material consequences
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Perception of lost of life risk in terrorist attacks varied sig-
nificantly by gender F (1,483) = 9.31, p = .002; age F (2,482) 
= 60.94, p = .001; by education level F (3,481) = 10.50, p = 
.000; by marital status F (3,481) = 7.72, p = .000; and by em-
ployment status F (1,483) = 34.54, p = .000. It was found that 
women, younger persons, unemployed persons, married 
people, and respondents with university education reported 
higher mean perception of life loss compared to men than the 
elderly, employed, respondents in relationship, and persons 
with secondary education (Table 5).
Perception of injuries in terrorist attacks varied signifi-
cantly by gender F (1,483) = 10.53, p = .001; by age F (2,482) 
= 68.32, p = .001; by education level F (3,482) = 11.69, p = 
.000; by marital status F (3,481) = 15.38, p = .000; and via em-
ployment status F (1,483) = 36.26, p = .000. It was found that 
women, younger persons, the unemployed, and respondents 
in relationship, with university education reported higher 
mean perception of injuries compared to men, the middle 
aged, the employed, the married, and respondents with sec-
ondary education (Table 5).
Perception of material consequences in terrorist attacks 
varied significantly by gender F (1,483) = 15.11, p = .000; by 
age F (2,482) = 27.96, p = .000; by education level F (3,482) = 
22.08, p = .000; by marital status F (3,481) = 11.27, p = .000; 
and by employment status F (1,483) = 19.99, p = .000. It was 
found that women, the unemployed, the married, younger 
reported higher mean perception of material consequences 
compared to men, the employed, those respondents in rela-
tionship, and the elderly (Table 5).
5.3  Terrorist attacks method perception
In relation to the obtained mean values, the respondents 
mostly point out that the terrorist groups could use explosives 
(M = 3.45), fire weapons (M = 2.98), chemical weapons (M 
= 2.72), biological weapons (M = 2.67), radiological weapons 
(M = 2.36), nuclear weapons (M = 2.26), and cold weapons 
(M = 2.01). Thus, most respondents point out (44.4%) that 
terrorist groups could use explosives, and the lowest number 
of respondents points out (5%) cold weapons (Figure 4).
Table 5:  Descriptive statistics (mean scores) given for perception of likelihood of loss of life, injuries and material consequences 
of terrorist attacks
Gender Age Education level Marital status Employment status
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Loss of life 1.93 (.763)
2.21 
(1.12)
2.40 
(1.04)
1.57 
(.533)
1.63 
(.814)
1.90 
(.891)
2.26 
(.950)
2.36 
(1.12)
2.11 
(1.08)
2.29 
(1.04)
3.01 
(.001)
1.78 
(.807)
2.28 
(1.054)
Injuries 2.09 (.859)
2.72 
(1.07)
2.77 
(1.08)
1.85 
(.959)
2.08 
(.583)
2.27 
(.886)
2.61 
(.495)
2.86 
(.763)
2.48 
(1.10)
2.83 
(1.11)
2.02 
(.000)
2.14 
(.733)
2.65 
(1.143)
Material 
consequences
2.27 
(.976)
2.64 
(1.12)
2.71 
(1.14)
2.26 
(.869)
1.92 
(.979)
2.29 
(1.09)
2.95 
(.226)
2.59 
(1.09)
2.41 
(.997)
2.70 
(1.29)
4.01 
(.001)
2.22 
(.979)
2.65 
(1.10)
*  In parentheses shown standard deviation. 
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For fire weapons as execution methods perceptions varied 
by gender t (1,483) = .142, p = .707; by age F (3,482) = 31.60, 
p = .000; by education level F (3,481) = 11.02, p = .000; by 
marital status F (3,481) = 11.95, p = .000; and by employment 
status F (1,483) = 9.87, p = .002. It was found that women, the 
unemployed, younger persons, respondents with secondary 
education, and single persons reported higher mean percep-
tion of fire weapons as execution methods compared to men, 
the employed, the elderly, respondents with university degree, 
and married persons (Table 6).
For explosive as execution methods perceptions varied by 
gender F (1,483) = .4.91, p = .027; by age F (2,482) = 74.77, p 
= .000; by education level F (3,481) = 8.09, p = .000; by marital 
status F (3,481) = 22.33, p = .000; and by employment status F 
(1,483) = 36.86, p = .000. It was found that women, the unem-
ployed, younger persons, respondents with secondary educa-
tion, and single persons reported higher mean perception of 
explosive as execution methods compared to men, the em-
ployed, the elderly, respondents with university degree, and 
married persons (Table 6).
For chemical weapons as execution methods, perceptions 
varied by gender F (1,483) = 142.3, p = .000; by age F (2,482) = 
63.11, p = .000; by education level F (3,481) = 3.04, p = .034; by 
marital status F (3,481) = 12.79, p = .000; and by employment 
status F (1,483) = 55.63, p = .000. It was found that women, 
the unemployed, younger persons, respondents with higher 
education, and single persons reported higher mean percep-
tion of chemical weapons as execution methods compared 
to men, employed persons, middle aged people, respondents 
with secondary education, and married persons (Table 6).
For biological weapons as execution methods perceptions 
varied by gender F (1,483) = 152.6, p = .000; by age F (2,482) = 
61.18, p = .000; by education level F (3,481) = 8.03, p = .000; by 
marital status F (3,481) = 11.49, p = .000; and by employment 
status F (1,483) = 47.11, p = .002. It was found that women, 
the unemployed, younger persons, respondents with higher 
education, and single persons reported higher mean percep-
tion of biological weapons as execution methods compared to 
men, the employed, middle aged persons, respondents with 
secondary education, and married persons (Table 6).
For nuclear weapons as execution methods perceptions 
varied by gender F (1,483) = 81.88, p = .000; by age F (2,482) 
= 70.37, p = .000; by education level F (3,481) = 5.41, p = .002; 
by marital status F (3,481) =9.76, p = .000; and by employment 
status F (1,483) =53.66, p = .000. It was found that women, the 
unemployed, younger persons, respondents with secondary 
education, and single persons reported higher mean percep-
tion of nuclear weapons as execution methods compared to 
men, the employed, middle aged persons, respondents with 
university degree, and those in relationship (Table 6).
For radiological weapons as execution methods percep-
tions varied by gender F (1,483) = 108.69, p = .000; by age F 
(2,482) = 76.16, p = .000; by education level F (3,481) = 7.65, 
p = .000; by marital status F (3,481) = 15.56, p = .000; and by 
employment status F (1,483) = 74.93, p = .000. It was found that 
women, the unemployed, younger persons, respondents with 
university degree, and single persons reported higher mean 
perception of radiological weapons as execution methods com-
pared to men, the employed, middle aged persons, respondents 
with secondary education, and those in relationship (Table 6).
Figure 4: Percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given 
for execution methods
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In Figure 5 authors summarizes percentage of respond-
ents and related Likert scale values given for perceptions of 
potential places of the terrorist attack. In relation to the ob-
tained mean values, the likelihood of an attack is the highest 
in a public place (M = 3.68), then in public buildings (M = 
3.49), than on state authorities (M = 3.33), than on a plane 
(M = 3.31), than on a train (M = 2.78), and finally at a health 
care institutions (M = 2.66). Thus, the majority of respondents 
point out (61.8%) that terrorist groups could attack in a pub-
lic place, and the smallest number of respondents point out 
(25.1%) health care institutions.
Public building perceptions varied by gender F (1,483) = 
7.37, p = .007; by age F (2,482) = 41.04, p = .000; by marital 
status F (3,481) = 5.93, p = .001; and by employment status F 
(1,483) = 82.07, p = .000, but did not vary by education level F 
(3,481) = 1.82, p = .059. It was found that women, single per-
sons, the unemployed, and younger persons reported higher 
mean public building perceptions as potential place of the 
terrorist attack compared to men, married persons, the em-
ployed, and the elderly (Table 7).
Public place perceptions varied by gender F (1,483) = 
11.59, p = .001; by age F (2,482) = 82.55, p = .000; by educa-
tion level F (3,481) = 5.89, p = .001; by marital status F (3,481) 
= 13.04, p = .000; and by employment status F (1,483) = 124.9, 
p = .000. It was found that women, single persons, the un-
employed, and younger people reported higher mean public 
place perceptions as potential place of the terrorist attack 
compared to men, married persons, the employed, and the 
elderly (Table 7).
Plane perceptions varied by gender F (1,483) = 28.51, p = 
.000; by age F (2,482) = 56.93, p = .000; by education level F 
(3,481) = 14.05, p = .000; by marital status F (3,481) = 19.83, p 
= .000; and by employment status F (1,483) = 54.27, p = .000. 
It was found that women, single persons, the unemployed, 
respondents with university education, and younger people 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics (mean scores) given for perception of potential execution methods
Gender Age Education level Marital status Employment status
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Fire weapons 2.96 (.977)
3.01 
(1.08)
3.22 
(1.11)
2.69 
(.719)
2.47 
(.824)
2.96 
(1.02)
2.37 
(1.21)
3.07 
(.963)
2.99 
(1.04)
3.24 
(1.11)
4.01 
(1.00)
2.79 
(.881)
3.10 
(1.11)
Explosive 3.33 (.849)
3.53 
(1.02)
3.74 
(.990)
3.19 
(.436)
2.66 
(.809)
3.26 
(.932)
3.71 
(1.13)
3.69 
(.907)
3.60 
(.959)
3.72 
(.994)
4.01 
(.000)
3.12 
(.766)
3.64 
(1.00)
Chemical 
weapons
2.03 
(.997)
3.21 
(1.12)
3.11 
(1.18)
1.94 
(1.15)
2.29 
(.689)
2.61 
(1.12)
3.00 
(1.27)
2.89 
(1.32)
2.85 
(1.06)
3.04 
(1.32)
2.01 
(.000)
2.22 
(1.02)
3.03 
(1.23)
Biological 
weapons
1.95 
(1.02)
3.18 
(1.11)
3.05 
(1.22)
1.91 
(1.11)
2.24 
(.709)
2.50 
(1.14)
3.18 
(1.18)
2.89 
(1.31)
2.80 
(1.09)
2.97 
(1.32)
2.02 
(.000)
2.20 
(1.02)
2.95  
(1.26)
Nuclear 
weapons
1.64 
(.978)
2.70 
(1.43)
2.69 
(1.38)
1.63 
(1.06)
1.42 
(.821)
2.07 
(1.22)
2.45 
(1.53)
2.57 
(1.49)
2.30 
(1.29)
2.64 
(1.41)
2.05 
(.000)
1.71 
(1.10)
2.59 
(1.40)
Radiological 
weapons
1.69 
(.911)
2.84 
(1.36)
2.80 
(1.32)
1.78 
(1.03)
1.45 
(.823)
2.13 
(1.23)
2.50 
(1.50)
2.73 
(1.34)
2.62 
(1.28)
2.75 
(1.27)
2.04 
(.002)
1.74 
(1.04)
2.74 
(1.33)
*  In parentheses shown standard deviation. 
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reported higher mean plane perceptions as potential place of 
the terrorist attack compared to men, married persons, em-
ployed people, respondents with secondary education, and 
the elderly (Table 7).
Bus perceptions varied by gender F (1,483) = 5.63, p = 
.018; by age F (2,482) = 15.38, p = .000; by education level F 
(3,481) = 11.43, p = .000; by marital status F (3,481) = 1.30, 
p = .271; and the employment status F (1,483) = 24.83, p = 
.000. It was found that women, married persons, the unem-
ployed, respondents with university education, and younger 
persons reported higher mean bus perceptions as potential 
place of the terrorist attack compared to men, single persons, 
employed people, respondents with secondary education, and 
the elderly (Table 7).
Train perceptions varied by gender F (1,483) = .000, p = 
.984; by age F (2,482) = 23.33, p = .000; by education level F 
(3,481) = 8.46, p = .000; by marital status F (3,481) = .860, p 
= .462; and by employment status F (1,483) = 20.41, p = .000. 
It was found that men, married persons, the unemployed, re-
spondents with university education, and younger persons 
reported higher mean train perceptions as potential place of 
the terrorist attack compared to women, single persons, em-
ployed persons, respondents with secondary education, and 
the elderly (Table 7).
Public authorities perceptions varied by gender F (1,483) 
= 37.42, p = .000; by age F (2,482) = 17.57, p = .000; by marital 
status F (3,481) = 11.58, p = .000, but do not vary by educa-
tion level F (3, 481) = 1.56, p = .202 or by employment status 
F (1,483) = 1.39, p = .238. It was found that women, single 
persons, and younger people reported higher mean public au-
thorities’ perceptions as potential place of the terrorist attack 
compared to men, married persons, and the elderly (Table 7).
Health care institutions perceptions varied by gender F 
(1,483) = 42.45, p = .000 and by age F (2,482) = 24.16, p = 
.000, but did not vary by education level F (3,481) = 1.10, p = 
.349, by marital status F (3,481) = 1.89, p = .129 and by em-
ployment status F (1,483) = 1.70, p = .057. It was found that 
women, younger persons, and single people reported higher 
mean health care institutions perceptions as potential place of 
the terrorist attack compared to men, the elderly, and married 
persons. (Table 7).
Figure 5: Percentage of respondents and related Likert scale value given 
for potential place of the terrorist attack
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6  Discussion
According to the official Government of Serbia report 
“National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of 
Terrorism for the Period 2016-2021, terrorism constitutes a 
clear and present danger to the national security of the coun-
try, its diplomats in other countries and to individual citizen 
safety. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the Balkan re-
gion. The modern history of Serbia has been marked by nu-
merous acts of terrorism, starting with the assassination of the 
heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Crown 
Prince Franz Ferdinand in 1914 -- an event that precipitated 
the global catastrophe of World War I. Violent acts to achieve 
political, religious and ethnic objectives have continued to oc-
cur on a regular basis, regardless of border changes and forms 
of government through periods of rule by monarchy, the long 
period of communism, the years of civil conflict following the 
disintegration of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s, up to the present time. Perhaps the threat of 
violent acts perpetrated in Serbia has never been greater than 
it is today due to the increasingly delicate security situation 
in Kosovo and Metohija, radicalization of Islamic youth in 
the Balkans resulting from the effective use of social media 
by extremist groups, and the return of ISIS fighters to their 
homes in the region following the destruction of their Islamic 
Caliphate in Syria and Iraq. All of these events represent a 
potential tinderbox that can explode into terrorism directed 
against the Republic of Serbia and its citizens. The effective 
addressing of these potential threats obviously should be di-
rected to eliminating the root causes of terrorism, but at the 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics (mean scores) given for perception of potential terrorist attacks
Gender Age Education level Marital status Employment status
M
en
W
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en
Yo
un
ge
r
M
id
dl
e a
ge
d
El
de
rly
Se
co
nd
ar
y
H
ig
h
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
Si
ng
le
In
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la
tio
ns
hi
p
M
ar
rie
d
Em
pl
oy
ed
U
un
em
pl
oy
ed
Public 
building
3.23 
(.974)
3.60 
(1.20)
3.85 
(.975)
2.96 
(.864)
2.82 
(1.36)
3.32 
(1.18)
3.45 
(.504)
3.63 
(1.15)
3.62 
(1.02)
3.61 
(1.13)
3.18 
(1.18)
2.92 
(1.13)
3.83 
(.959)
Public place 3.48 (1.02)
3.83 
(1.22)
4.14 
(.908)
3.06 
(.936)
2.79 
(1.36)
3.55 
(1.22)
4.11 
(.894)
3.78 
(1.10)
3.96 
(.978)
3.82 
(1.18)
3.22 
(1.20)
2.98 
(1.19)
4.12 
(.892)
Plane 3.01 (.998)
3.53 
(1.14)
3.69 
(1.06)
2.80 
(.758)
2.55 
(1.07)
3.06 
(1.17)
3.71 
(.867)
3.66 
(.932)
3.36 
(1.05)
3.60 
(1.05)
2.87 
(1.08)
2.85 
(1.12)
3.59 
(1.01)
Bus 2.73 (.971)
2.97 
(1.17)
3.12 
(1.09)
2.57 
(.899)
2.32 
(1.08)
2.69 
(1.11)
3.42 
(.826)
3.01 
(1.11)
2.76 
(1.12)
3.01 
(1.04)
2.86 
(1.14)
2.55 
(1.13)
3.07 
(1.02)
Train 2.87 (.905)
2.86 
(1.19)
3.06 
(1.04)
2.72 
(.759)
2.34 
(1.37)
2.72 
(1.21)
2.95 
(.226)
3.07 
(.954)
2.88 
(1.01)
2.96 
(1.07)
2.76 
(1.18)
2.59 
(1.10)
3.07 
(1.02)
Public 
authorities
2.96 
(1.21)
3.59 
(1.01)
3.47 
(1.09)
2.78 
(1.33)
3.55 
(.681)
3.26 
(1.13)
3.29 
(.565)
3.43 
(1.25)
2.62 
(1.26)
2.56 
(1.24)
2.97 
(1.01)
3.25 
(1.13)
3.38 
(1.13)
Health care 
institutions
2.26 
(1.05)
2.94 
(1.18)
2.88 
(1.17)
2.01 
(.886)
2.74 
(1.25)
2.61 
(1.17)
2.84 
(.495)
2.69 
(1.32)
2.69 
(1.29)
2.78 
(1.09)
2.49 
(1.15)
2.50 
(1.11)
2.76 
(1.21)
*  In parentheses shown standard deviation. 
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same time government agencies – national and local alkie -- 
and individual citizens should be aware of this growing threat. 
Various forms of violent acts (e.g., improvised explosive de-
vices, chemical or biological terrorism) are possible. There 
are a range of citizen safety actions that can be taken by the 
population to minimize morbidity and mortality in the case 
of a terrorist attack.
The study described in this paper addresses critical initial 
steps in the counter-terrorism planning process, namely de-
termining the state of perception of citizens in Serbia regard-
ing terrorism and the current state of individual, household 
and government preparedness and security in the event of 
such violent acts. Documenting the degree of knowledge that 
individual citizens have regarding the types of weapons most 
likely to be used against them by terrorists, potential health 
consequences of these weapons, most likely areas and parts of 
municipal infrastructure that terrorists would target and last 
but not least, what sort of optimal measures citizens can take 
to maximize their probability of survival. 
Public health planners and emergency management 
agencies will benefit greatly from the results of our study. 
Our results will assist in identifying demographic and socio-
economic differences vis-à-vis a community’s perception of 
overall risk of a terrorist attack. Furthermore, knowledge of 
a community’s perception of terrorist attack risk will assist 
appropriate emergency management agencies in developing 
public health messages, programs, and distribution channels 
tailor-made for a given community based on evidence-based 
decision making. Emergency management agencies should 
account for these differences in terrorism risk perception 
between different communities and state jurisdictions in the 
crafting of more useful counter-terrorism strategizes and 
plans based on behavioral change promotion and risk man-
agement decision-making.
The recently published report “National Strategy for the 
Prevention and Countering of Terrorism” concludes that the 
trend of terrorism is not only a clear and present danger to 
both national security and safety of the citizens of Serbia, but 
the probability of deadly attacks with the potential for thou-
sands of casualties (mostly citizens) will only increase in the 
next 5-10 years due to a variety of factors, including increased 
tensions in the Kosovo and Metohija area, increased radi-
calization of home-grown terrorism, as well as infiltration of 
violent and battle-hardened ISIS fighters into the country. In 
addition, the specter of partnerships between cross-border 
organized crime elements in the drug and human-trafficking 
business and Islamic terrorists intent on committing acts of 
violence enhances the prospects for serious trouble ahead. 
However, contrary to the findings of this official government 
report, the results of our survey of citizens in Belgrade sug-
gest that almost 60% of the study respondents believe that a 
terrorist attack does not present an imminent threat to public 
safety or national security – that is, within the next 12 months. 
Strengthening our contention (based on results from our lim-
ited study sample of residents living in Belgrade) that our 
view apparently is shared by the Chief of the Department for 
Combating Terrorism of the Republic of Serbia Ministry of 
Interior who reports that the possibility for a terrorist attack 
is low at the moment, but he expresses concerns for the years 
to come due to evidence of increased “self-radicalization” 
among young people in predominantly Muslim communities 
and neighborhoods. 
The latter point of concern is supported by our study, 
which shows that respondents tend to believe that the prob-
ability of a terrorist attack will increase within the next 5-10 
years. Furthermore, our study results also indicate a major-
ity of respondents (55.6%) believe that the local community 
is unprepared to respond to a terrorist event, and that 45.1% 
fear that individual citizens are unprepared. The results of our 
study are consistent with findings from past studies of public 
risk perception of terrorism threats. Results of studies in Tokyo 
(Byers, 2014) following the sarin chemical weapon attack on 
the city’s subway system in 1995 and following the attacks on 
the World Trade Center in New York City on 11 September 
2001 (Simon & Teperman, 2001) also revealed the following: 
(1) that the communities affected by these two catastrophic ter-
rorist events perceived that the probability of a terrorist attack 
will increase within the next 5-10 years; (2) that most study 
respondents believed that the local community continued to 
be unprepared to respond to a terrorist event; and (3) that in-
dividual citizens remained unprepared despite just having re-
cently experienced major terrorist attacks with large loss of life. 
There are very few studies in the literature on the topic of 
community risk perception regarding a “real” future terrorist 
attacks targeting that community. Our results, however, are 
consistent with research findings conducted in several loca-
tions in Romania (Stănescu et al., 2016). The Romanian stud-
ies indicated that even though Romanian authorities faced 
relatively strong and real threats of terrorist attacks during 
the period of these studies (i.e., terrorism threats were near 
the top of the list of potential disasters according to official 
Government of Romania National security strategy docu-
ments), the threat of terrorism was ranked near the bottom 
of potential disaster threats by local community civil de-
fense and emergency management officials. Also, the results 
of our study are consistent with research findings in Canada 
(Lemyre et al., 2006) regarding demographic differences in 
perceptions of terrorism and gender representing an impor-
tant determinant. Our findings showed that a statistically sig-
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nificant percentage of male respondents believe that there is a 
low probability of a terrorist attack in the near future. These 
findings are consistent with  past studies of public risk percep-
tion of terrorism threats (Lemyre et al., 2006) where citizens 
do not consider terrorism to be a large threat to the Canadian 
public, nor do they perceive it as a great threat to themselves. 
This belief goes in the face of direct evidence that the Republic 
of Serbia is a major hub on the most widely used illicit transit 
routes to Western Europe, both for home-grown radicalized 
individuals from Muslim communities in the Balkans and 
ISIS fighters fleeing from their defeats in the Middle East and 
Africa. Other worrisome findings of our study have shown 
that the statistically significant majority of respondents would 
give community emergency management organizations low 
marks for their overall preparedness efforts and the degree of 
effectiveness of such planning process efforts.
7  Conclusion
Results of our survey indicate that there are major differ-
ences in the public’s perception of risks presented by terrorism 
threats in Belgrade. We encourage emergency management 
agencies in Serbia to use their knowledge of these differences 
in public perception of risks identified in our study to develop 
enhanced counter-terrorism preparedness measures through 
the promotion of behavioural change, an adjustment of 
thought which goes with the adoption of improved risk man-
agement decision-making procedures. For example, the gen-
eral public needs to be trained in initial care of victims in the 
same way Basic Life Support is currently taught. Furthermore, 
to improve risk management decision-making we need to 
anticipate virtually all possible scenarios because terrorism 
is now a clear and present danger to the safety of citizens of 
Serbia. All cities and towns in Serbia need to have up-to-date 
disaster plans that are tailored to specific scenarios and lo-
cations as opposed to only preconceived generalized plans. 
Airport plane crashes, stadium catastrophes, and remote mass 
transit accidents are all vastly different routes to terrorist at-
tacks and require different responses. Communications need 
to be standardized and backed up. Triage needs to be thought 
out more clearly. Scene control to prevent access from unau-
thorized medical personnel is likewise important. The prob-
lems of a building collapse caused by blast devices need to be 
addressed by engineers and EMS planners.
Limitations of our study include: 1) potential bias in se-
lecting study subjects to complete questionnaires; 2) no study 
participants had any experience with a “real life” terrorist 
event; and 3) the study used primarily quantitative research 
methods and could have benefited from a more qualitative 
analytic approach. Future research would benefit from a more 
epidemiologic approach (e.g. case-control and cohort studies) 
to determine risk factors for poor community responses to a 
given terrorist event, “before and after” studies looking at a 
population in Serbia that has been affected by a human-gen-
erated disasters such as terrorism, and studies using currently 
validated modelling and simulation methods.
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Glede na dolgoletno zgodovino terorističnih groženj v Srbiji je cilj prispevka opredeliti stopnjo pripravljenosti posameznikov, lokalnih 
skupnosti in občinskih institucij na zaznavanje tveganj za teroristične napade v Beogradu, prestolnici Republike Srbije. Uporabljen je 
bil strukturirani vprašalnik o zaznavi tveganj terorističnih napadov in pripravljenosti na njih. Vprašalnik je obsegal vprašanja zaprtega 
tipa z več možnimi odgovori in vprašanja, ki so bila merjena na petstopenjski Likertovi lestvici. Anketiranje je potekalo med junijem 
in septembrom 2017 v obliki telefonske ankete z uporabo naključnih številk klicanja. V študiji je sodelovalo 485 odraslih prebivalcev, 
ki so se strinjali s sodelovanjem v študiji. Odgovori anketirancev so opozorili na nizko verjetnost za teroristični napad, v primerjavi z 
verjetnostjo terorističnih napadov v njihovi skupnosti in omejeno znanje o protiterorističnih dejavnostih, ki jih trenutno izvajajo javni 
organi. Nadalje so ugotovitve pokazale statistično pomembne razlike v zaznavi terorističnih groženj v Beogradu glede na demografske 
značilnosti, kot so starost, spol, zaposlitev in pretekle izkušnje z večjimi izrednimi dogodki. Agencije kriznega upravljanja v Srbiji bi 
morale uporabiti ugotovitve te študije pri razvoju ukrepov pripravljenosti zoper terorizem, ki bi temeljili na spodbujanju sprememb v 
vedenju – sprejetje učinkovitejših postopkov odločanja v kriznem upravljanju. Za izboljšanje odločanja v kriznem upravljanju je treba 
predvideti skoraj vse možne scenarije, saj predstavlja terorizem nevarnost za državljane Srbije. Vsa srbska mesta bi morala posedovati 
posodobljene načrte za upravljanje v kriznih situacijah, ki bi bili prilagojeni glede na specifične scenarije in lokacije, v nasprotju s 
trenutno veljavnimi preddoločenimi splošnimi načrti.
Ključne besede: terorizem, zaznava tveganja, grožnja, pripravljenost, sprejemanje odločitev, Beograd
UDK: 343.3(497.11)
View publication stats
